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It seems obvious that any interesting scientific hypothesis has implications whose truth cannot be established by direct observation. This may be because the hypothesis has 
implications for what goes on at distant locations, or in the 
future or for any other reasons. There is thus little hope that we 
will be able to simply deduce the truth of scientific hypotheses 
and theories from observations in the way that conclusions can 
be deduced from their premises in logic. This claim is supported 
by the history of science, which tells us that even the best-
confirmed theories (such as Newtonian gravitational theory) can 
be undermined by further evidence. Thus, while fields such as 
mathematics and logic trade in certainties; scientific hypotheses 
always remain at least partly conjectural (1).
In light of this situation, some philosophers have attempted 
to apply the concepts of probability to scientific theories and 
hypotheses. While it may be impossible to establish a scientific 
hypothesis with certainty, a hypothesis may be rendered more 
or less probable in light of evidence. Evidence that increases the 
probability of a theory is said to support or confirm that theory, 
while evidence that lowers the probability of a theory is said to 
undermine or disconfirm it. One of the reasons why there is a gap 
between observational evidence and scientific theory is that the 
latter often makes claims about entities that are unobservable. 
Abstract
We show a lot of respect for science today. To back up our claims, 
we tend to appeal to scientific methods. It seems that we all agree 
that these methods are effective for gaining the truth. We can ask 
why science has its special status as a supplier of knowledge about 
our external world and our bodies. Of course, one should not always 
trust what scientists say. Nonetheless, epistemological justification 
of scientific claims is really a big project for philosophers of science. 
Philosophers of science are interested in knowing how science 
proves what it does claim and why it gives us good reasons to 
take these claims seriously. These questions are epistemological 
questions. Epistemology is a branch of philosophy which deals 
with knowledge claims and justification. Besides epistemological 
questions, metaphysical and ethical issues in science are worthy 




Are scientific claims about unobservable entities especially 
problematic? Questions of this sort are central to millennia-old 
debates between realism and anti-realism. Confirmation and the 
relation of theory and evidence are not the only philosophical 
problems that arise from science. Scientists try to explain natural 
phenomena and philosophers try to understand how scientist 
explain things.
 Consider the following story1. 
A large cancerous tumour was removed from a 51 year old 
man in 1956 in a Massachusetts hospital and accordingly he was 
diagnosed with a number of other tumours—all inoperable. His 
case was filed away and he was sent home to die. Surprisingly, 
the same man, twelve years later, showed up in the emergency 
room of the same hospital with an swollen gallbladder. Some 
doctors concluded that the original diagnosis had been false and 
think no more of it, Steven Rosenberg, a young surgeon, was 
not like his colleagues. Having searched all the related hospital 
records, Rosenberg found the original tissue slides of the patient’s 
removed tumour and reexamined them. The slides showed that 
an aggressively malignant tumour had been removed from the 
man in the first operation and it was almost certain that the 
inoperable ones had been of the same aggressively malignant 
type. During the subsequent operation to remove the patient’s 
gallbladder Rosenberg explored the man’s abdomen to see if 
the inoperable tumours from twelve years earlier had stopped 
growing. The man had no tumours at all in the places his record 
from twelve years earlier located them.
To Rosenberg, the man whose gallbladder he had removed 
presented a mystery. How had a patient with multiple inoperable 
cancerous tumours survived for twelve years in the apparent 
absence of any therapy whatsoever? Such “spontaneous 
remissions” have not been unheard of in medicine—they have 
long been a central obsession of fashionable occultists and other 
kinds of healers—but Rosenberg wanted to know the detailed 
why of it.
Rosenberg looked for an explanation of spontaneous 
remission in perfectly natural terms. He wanted to know how a 
physiological processes—i.e. the immune system of the human 
body could produce such a remission. Rosenberg carried on the 
assumption  that there had to be some structural physiological 
basis behind the patient’s remission and survival for twelve 
1. This example is taken from Klee, 1997 (1) 
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years, a structural physiological basis that was consistent with 
the otherwise ordinary causal operations of the human body. 
Rosenberg was looking after the causal details of that structural 
physiological basis.
If he could find out those details, especially if they were 
quantitative details, then the possibility of being able to 
manipulate the physiology of cancer patients emerges.
Finally, not only did he find an explanation in perfectly natural 
terms for the original patient’s spontaneous remission, but using 
the theoretical account of immunological processes associated 
with that explanation he was able to design a complicated 
treatment involving artificially growing cancer killing immune 
cells outside the body. These cancer-killing immune cells, called 
lymphokine activated killer (LAK) cells, are injected back into 
the patient’s body in an attempt to intervene and manipulate 
the patient’s immune response to the cancer. Rosenberg and 
his colleagues have had a considerable degree of success at 
producing remissions with this therapy but only for specific 
kinds of cancer—particularly, kidney cancer and skin cancer. 
Apparently, knowledge of further structural detail is needed in 
order to be able to design LAK cells that are effective in other 
kinds of solid-tumor cancers.
The preceding case illustrates the important point that science 
involves a practical engagement with the natural world. This 
point is often lost sight of when science is portrayed by both 
its supporters and critics as a largely intellectual enterprise, as 
a game consisting mostly of free-form conceptual speculation. 
The process through which science produces knowledge is more 
constrained than that, and it is messier in the bargain.
Rosenberg desired a scientific explanation of what was 
experimentally and observationally unquestionable—the 
spontaneous remission of his gallbladder patient’s previous 
cancer. Most philosophers take explanation to be the main 
business of science. They spend much of their time to study some 
account or other of scientific explanation—what it requires and 
how it differs from other kinds of explanation in other realms. 
In the situation in which Rosenberg found himself, if anything, 
there were too many alternative explanations (1,2). Theories go 
far beyond the data that support them; indeed, the theories 
would be of little interest if this were not so. However, this 
means that a scientific theory is always ‘underdetermined’ by 
the available data. Even if there were no anomaly in sight, so 
the theory is compatible with all known data, it is impossible to 
deduce or prove the theory from them. This means that there 
always exists, in principle, incompatible theories that also would 
have fit those data.
For now, it might be instructive to consider what Steven 
Rosenberg did in the face of the underdetermination of theory. 
His task was to pare down the number of competing possible 
theoretical explanations for his patient’s spontaneous remission 
in a rationally defensible way—in an evidence based way and not 
in an arbitrary way. He used the finely detailed causal structure 
in the human immune system to do so; and, in that way, he let 
the independent causal structure of the world push back against 
his own hypothesizing to do the paring down. Thus, Rosenberg’s 
general procedure was evidence driven in a way that, say, 
theological speculation and political rhetoric are not. The latter 
two practices are not forms of knowledge gathering primarily 
driven forward and constrained by independent causal evidence.
Another big project for philosophers of science is metaphysical 
questions about science. Scientists often talk about laws. In our 
story, there seems to be laws governing LAK cells behaviour 
regarding kidney tumours.  Modern science, especially modern 
physics, is often described as a search for, among other things, 
the laws of nature. Few physicists claim that we have any of the 
actual laws of nature at hand, but nonetheless it is often said that 
we are closing in on these laws. Moreover, the major theories 
of modern physics, including classical mechanics, classical 
thermodynamics, quantum mechanics and general relativity, 
are all usually interpreted as proposing sets of laws. Many other 
scientific theories put forward principles or equations that are 
designed as laws. All of this shows that the concept of laws 
of nature is a central one for modern science or at least that 
scientists often take it to be. So what makes something a law? 
Philosophers want to know what it is to be a law of nature (3). 
Scientific talk is infused with causal terms. Remember 
Rosenberg’s story. LAK cells were injected because they were 
causally effective in preventing the cancer.  Philosophers of 
science are eager know what constitutes causal relations in 
science. The nature of causation is philosophically controversial 
(4). Some philosophers, following the empiricist approach of 
Hume, think that, even as it occurs in particular cases, causation 
is to be understood in terms of the holding of something more 
general, so that for one item to cause another is, or is partly, 
a matter of there being some law or regularity concerning the 
sequential occurrence of items of those types. Other philosophers 
think that causation is something irreducibly singular, so that 
when one item causes another, that is not to do with how things 
behave or are constrained in general, but is purely to do with 
how things stand with respect to those particular items. 
Philosophers of science never seem to settle their own 
arguments and, in so far as their argument yields any result, it 
is one of generalized agnosticism that is not a live option for 
scientists. One might go so far as to worry that if philosophy did 
have any impact on scientists, it would be pernicious, depriving 
them of the kinds of commitment and confidence upon which 
their practice depends. However there are few scientists who 
want to understand how science works and it is natural for them 
to wish to turn this curiosity back on themselves, and so to wish 
to understand how their own enterprise works. This is why they 
may find philosophy of science worth pursuing. 
Philosophy of medicine
Medicine is an interesting case study for philosophers of science. 
However, philosophers tended to ignore it until 1960.  At the 
end of the 1960’s, conferences had begun to recognize puzzles 
of a philosophical sort about medicine.   There was a cultural 
appetite to locate medicine within larger cultural contexts. The 
discipline represented vividly interplay of values, institutions, 
science, technology, economic forces and most importantly 
human interaction of patients and physicians. The appetite 
was driven by the increasing popularity and achievements of 
medicine itself. In every developed country, health care was 
claiming a larger portion of the gross domestic product. The 
promise of new technologies also threatened apparently novel 
moral and public policy puzzles.
If physics deserved a philosophy of physics, medicine seemed 
to deserve something like a philosophy of medicine. Although 
that  term was hardly used in the 1960’s philosophy of medicine 
had a history that reached to the beginning of the 19th century 
(5). The first philosophical debates focused on the question of 
scientific status of medicine. Is medicine a science? It seems 
almost banal not to identify medicine with biology. The former 
involves close cooperation and interaction of doctor and 
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patient, an extremely vital feature the latter lacks. Based on 
this observation, some philosophers have argued that medicine 
should be best envisaged as a social science (6).
Critical care units and organ transplantation, like other new 
technologies used in medicine, pressed for clarity about issues 
such as determining when death occurs. Old ethical problems 
became more pressing because these new technologies had 
become safer and more tempting: for instance, abortion became 
associated with fewer risks of mortality, and there was the 
promise of ever more effective prenatal diagnosis and selective 
destruction of fetuses. Moreover, there appeared to be purely 
philosophical issues such as the nature of disease and illness 
that were addressed by neither the philosophy of medicine nor 
even the philosophy of biology. Are disease natural features 
of the world? Should we be realist about diseases or there are 
just social conventions? There were these and many other 
issues of evaluation of evidence, epistemological questions, and 
explanation associated with medicine that have since given birth 
to sustained philosophical reflection and analysis. Three decades 
ago, few philosophers seemed to notice them. Or if they noticed 
them, they were not yet sure how to name them or whether to 
place them within an independent field.
For instance, it is widely believed that medical results and 
evidence should be obtained via randomized controlled 
experiments. This very  sentence needs much of  philosophical 
clarifications. At a close inspection, it turns out that medical 
practice has always been based on elusive and plural notions 
of evidence, such as clues and symptoms, but what should 
be counted as evidence has changed over time. For instance, 
effectiveness of treatments was once judged on the basis of a 
complex mix of theory, clinical observation and testimony, 
but as case descriptions (and treatments) became more 
standardized and comparisons could be made, assessment of 
effectiveness moved beyond the single cases and case series, and 
adopted the population as the unit of assessment and analysis. 
The Randomized Controlled Trial  (RCT), and meta-analyses 
thereof, have become the primary means by which medical 
interventions (particularly pharmaceutical interventions) are 
deemed effective and worthy of funding. Given the power 
accorded to the RCT (philosophers call it as the “gold standard” 
of medical research) there is a growing tendency to subject 
epistemology of RCT to rigorous scrutiny (7). 
Above mentioned problems have shaped what we call philosophy 
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